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I. Introduction

In the recurring ebb and flow of health policy panaceas, the notion of
rewarding health care providers-especially hospitals, physicians, or groups of
* The author is indebted to Professor Lawrence Casalino of the University of Chicago
for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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physicians-with additional payments or bonuses for the attainment of highquality services has achieved particular prominence in recent years. Such
incentive payments were a priority recommendation of the Institute of Medicine
(1OM) panel that produced the ground-breaking report, Crossing the Quality
Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century.' The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), which has enthusiastically endorsed the TOM
approach, has already begun a demonstration project to pay bonuses to
Medicare+Choice plans that meet certain standards in the care of patients with
congestive heart failure. 2 Additionally, a coalition of private-sector purchasers
has recently announced other demonstration projects along similar lines in three
cities for care of patients with diabetes and congestive heart failure and for
physicians' implementation of "patient care management systems. 3 This issue
of the Washington and Lee University Law Review contains Dr. Robert
Berenson's especially thoughtful article advocating such an approach.'
To date, the growing discussion in policy circles about the desirability of
providing financial incentives for higher-quality care assumes that the idea is a
good one prima facie and has focused almost entirely on the formidable
technical obstacles to implementing such mechanisms in a way that is reliable,
reproducible, and at least facially fair.' Most of the arguments by those
opposed to or uneasy about such incentive programs, such as organizations of
hospitals or physicians, have focused on these technical obstacles, without
questioning the underlying premises.6 The technical problems are indeed
1. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI.,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 17, 181-206

(2001 ) [hereinafter QUALITY CHASM] (recommending that "[p]rivate and public purchasers ...
examine their current payment methods to remove barriers that currently impede quality
improvement and to build stronger incentives for quality enhancements").
2.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,

45 DAY NOTICE FOR 2002 M+C RATES, at http://cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/rates/2002/45day.asp
(last visited Sept. 2, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3.

KAISER DAILY HEALTH REPORT, GROUP OF LARGE EMPLOYERS TO OFFER PHYSICIANS

BONUSES FOR QUALITY CARE (Apr. 10, 2003), at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports
/repindex.cfm?hint=3&DRID =17111 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Robert A. Berenson, PayingforQuality and Doing it Right, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REv.
1351 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Laura B. Becko, Special Reports: A Rewarding Relationship; Hospitalsand
Docs Eye Seeing More of Their Pay Tied to Performance Based on Quality Measures and Other
Contractual Objectives, 33 MODERN HEALTHCARE 28, 28-30 (2003) (discussing performance

payments and noting the debate over effective implementation of rewarding quality).
6. See, e.g., Majorie Beyers, Viewpoint: Report Cards are Here to Stay, 19 PATIENT
CARE MGMT. 10, 10 (2003) (outlining criticisms of report cards including concerns over

accuracy, comparability across different organizations, and the ability ofthe public to effectively
use the information).
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significant and may in fact be of such magnitude as to eventually limit the
applicability of such incentives to a relatively small fraction of providers caring
for a relatively small fraction of patients. But, this Article will not give much
attention to those technical issues, which more appropriately should be
considered in a journal of medicine or of health services research. Rather, I
wish to argue that differential payment for medical services on the basis of the
quality of those services (assuming, arguendo,that differences in quality can be
appropriately measured), is an intrinsically bad idea. Adopting such methods
will reinforce some of the most deleterious trends in the American health
system, while diverting energy from-and possibly working against-other
methods of demonstrated efficacy to improve quality.
In order to make this argument, this Article will first briefly describe the
origins of the current infatuation with paying bonuses for quality. Describing
the sources of this enthusiasm will help to illuminate some of the larger issues it
raises. The Article then describes four conceptual problems in differential
payment on the basis of quality, followed by a discussion of five problems with
providing financial incentives for higher quality that are at once both practical
and ethical. That will lead into a discussion of the more general issue that
underlies the entire debate-the conceptual, practical, and ethical complexities
of paying appropriately for professional services.
II. Origins of the Contemporary Enthusiasmfor Payingfor Quality
Although lone voices have often cried out in the wilderness, widespread
concern for the quality of care provided in the American medical system is a
relatively recent phenomenon. During the last two decades or so, the following
forces have converged, along with others, to create what might be called "The
Conventional Consensus" about quality of care:
9 The automation of health insurance functions, especially claims
processing and particularly in the Medicare program, created large
"administrative" databases which could be used to characterize
patterns of care; more recently, the evolution of data processing
technology has made such databases significantly
more accessible
7
and more manageable for researchers.

Lisa I. lezzoni, Assessing Quality Using Administrative Data, 127 ANNALS OF
666,670-73 (1997) (arguing that databases are useful in evaluating quality and
that with new technology, their usefulness is improving).
7.

INTERNAL MED.
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* Beginning in the 1970s, for information about quality of care not
ordinarily retrievable from administrative databases,
Congress
8
created organizations to review Medicare quality.
"

The emergence, over time, of the randomized clinical trial (RCT)
as the "gold standard" for the evaluation of medical interventions
has fostered a growing quantity of evaluative information about
the relative benefits, or lack of benefits, of a myriad of medical
activities.

" Armed with data from RCTs, and spurred on by the National
Institutes of Health encouragement of"consensus conferences" in
areas of clinical controversy or confusion, specialty societies and
other professional groups have developed and promulgated
guidelines for appropriate
treatment of literally hundreds of
10
medical conditions.
" Beginning with the pioneering studies by the RAND Corporation,
Harvard University, and the University of Pennsylvania in the
1970s, an entire generation of researchers has been trained in the
conduct of health services research centered on the quality of care,
and a variety of methodological developments have become
available to overcome some of the more significant problems in
such research.
" Since the 1970s, Dr. John Wennberg and his colleagues have
produced a continuing stream of research showing large variations
in the utilization rate of many medical procedures and health care
resources (such as inpatient hospital beds) across communities,
with no apparent
connection to differential health status in those
1
communities.'

8. Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System: The Movement for
Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 488, 489-90 (1999) (discussing

organizations that are concerned with Medicare quality).
9.

See Mark R. Chassin, Is Health CareReady for Six Sigma Quality?, 76 MILBANK Q.

565, 574 (1998) (stating that the quantity of RCT articles has risen from 100 per year in 1966 to
10,000 in 1995).
10. See generally NAT'L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, GUIDELINE INDEX, at
http://www.guidline.gov/index.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
I1. See, e.g., Carol Ashton et al., GeographicVariationsin Utilization Rates in Veteran
Affairs Hospitalsand Clinics, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 32, 34 (finding longer hospital stays in the

northeastern United States than on the west coast). But see Bruce C. Vladeck, VariationsData
and the Regulatory Rationale,HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 102,103 (concluding that "while
variations may be a big part of the problem, they are of only limited help in designing the
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" The growth of managed care in the late 1980s and 1990s spawned
its own small sub-industry of research that sought to compare
managed care plans'2 quality of care to that in the traditional feefor-service system.'
"

The failure of comprehensive efforts at health care reform in the
Clinton Administration's first term led officials to seek out other
areas of health care policy in which they might receive public
attention13and approbation for innovation; they chose health care
quality.

What I have called "The Conventional Consensus" has drawn on all of
these developments to conclude that:
1. It is possible to draw on clinical guidelines and other products of
professional consensus to establish defensible, measurable standards for
quality of care.
2. Applying those standards, the quality of care provided in many
settings, for many different kinds of patients, in most communities in the
United States, falls far short of acceptable standards.
3. Moving more of medical practice into closer conformity with those
standards would not only increase the quality of care (an almost
tautological result) but, more importantly, would improve outcomes for
patients, includinf reduced mortality and morbidity and improved
functional status.'
Efforts to translate The Conventional Consensus into policies and
programs have been occurring throughout this period, and frustration over the
relatively slow pace of progress in improving care lies at the heart of much of
the movement to add financial incentives. Improvements in data processing,
research methodologies, the supply of researchers, and funding for research
have produced an ever-widening torrent of studies and analyses documenting
the gap between optimal and actual patterns of care. 5 The more sophisticated
solution").
12. For an excellent recent review of this literature, see generally Robert H. Miller and
Harold S. Luft, HMO Plan PerformanceUpdate: An Analysis of the Literature,1997-2001,
HEALTH Arr., July/Aug. 2002, at 63.

13.

Confidential communications to author.

14. Cf.Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality:
Institute of Medicine National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1000

(1998) (concluding that "[c]urrent efforts to improve will not succeed unless we deliver health
care services, educate and train clinicians, and assess and improve quality").
15. For an especially widely-reported recent example of one such study, see generally
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the research becomes, the more serious the problems seem to be. Yet,
publication of clinical guidelines, in and of itself, does not appear to have much
impact on changing the behavior of physicians whose practice patterns do not
conform to those guidelines, and even more sophisticated educational efforts
seem to have only limited effect.' 6 Using the tools of The Conventional
Consensus, quality appears to be reasonably poor and-more importantly-not
improving very fast; hence the search for other, more powerful interventions to
improve quality.
Although no one can argue with the proposition that the public would be
best served if the quality of medical care improved as much and as rapidly as
possible, one cannot help observing that at least some of the frustration
surrounding the entire quality of care discussion may reflect the kind of simple
impatience with complex problems that characterizes much of American
culture, and perhaps especially American medical culture. To name, or even
characterize, a problem is not to solve it, but contemporary American society
and the political system embedded in that society, sometimes confuse the two.
Significant social change-especially when that change requires alteration of
strongly-imbedded behaviors among hundreds of thousands of highly-trained,
highly autonomous professionals-frequently takes a fair amount of time. But,
that does not mean it does not occur. Advances in clean air and clean water, as
well as decreasing crime rates and adult tobacco use, suggest that change can
happen over a sufficient period of time. Those concerned with the quality of
medical care, however, seem unwilling to wait, even when the problem they are
concerned with solving has been recognized only recently-and may not yet be
fully understood. Thus, much of the argument in favor of employing financial
incentives to improve quality takes the form of "we've tried everything else,
and that hasn't worked," even though, from a distance, it would appear that a
more accurate conclusion might be that "we've sort of tried many things, and
it's too soon to tell which of them will work, and how well."
Frustrations over the putative failure of other mechanisms to improve
quality also dovetails conveniently with a second source of the current
enthusiasm for financial incentives-the growing hegemony of microeconomic
modes of analysis in health policy discussions of all sorts. Despite the fact that
efforts to introduce greater "marketplace competition" into the health care
sector have produced primarily baleful consequences, and despite the powerful
Elizabeth A McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United
States, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2635 (2003).
16. See generally Jonathan Lomas et al., Do PracticeGuidelines Guide Practice? The
Effect of a Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 N. ENG. J. MED. 1306

(1989).
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and growing body of evidence on the inapplicability of neoclassical microeconomic
models to most of the health care sector,17 the congruence between the ideological
biases implicit in economic models of social phenomena and the interests of ruling
elites leaves economics in a uniquely powerful position within American social
sciences and its offshoot of public policy analysis."8 Economic incentives are thus
proposed as the solutions to most problems, from juvenile crime to reductions in
marriage rates. Because health care services already generally (and perhaps
increasingly) involve economic transactions, it seems only natural, within the
prevailing zeitgeist, to attempt to influence those transactions using economic tools.
Identifying the cultural and ideological implications of a focus on financial
incentives as a means of improving quality in the health care system also helps identify
the third, and perhaps most troubling, source of the current enthusiasm for such
approaches. The legitimization of economic incentives as a means of changing the
quality-related behavior of health care providers would provide a mechanism for
further shifting control of the health care system from those who provide health care to
those who pay for it, or their intermediaries. Over the last decade or so, a number of
perceptive observers of the American medical scene have made the argument that, in
an implicit exchange for greater financial independence and self-control, American
physicians, in contrast to their counterparts in other industrialized nations with some
form of universal health insurance, have accepted greater interference with their
clinical autonomy and practice organization.' 9 Payors, both public and private, already
exercise, or attempt to exercise, influence on how many patients physicians see in a
given period oftime, what tests and procedures the physicians order, which drugs they
will prescribe, and so forth. To date, definition and assurance of the quality of care
have been perhaps the most important dimensions ofphysician autonomy to have been
shielded from payor interference and involvement.20 Invoking arguments related to
17. See generally THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1998)
(examining over adozen of the assumptions that need to be fulfilled to ensure that a free market
results in the best outcome for society and finding that none of those assumptions applies to the
health care industry).
18. Cf THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A MEMORANDUM ON THE
CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN 221-22 (Sagamore Press 1957) (1918) (exploring
the effects of corporate financial support on higher education).
19. Richard A. Culbertson & Philip R. Lee, Medicare and Physician Autonomy, 18
HEALTH CARE FN. 115, 119 (1996). Culbertson and Lee state:
The application of Reinhardt's law to the late-20th-century United States scene
would appear to indicate a priority on the part of physicians to pursue economic
betterment at the expense of clinical autonomy. If so, this would be critical in
reformulating a definition of autonomy for the future, for this observation implies
the willingness of physicians to sacrifice control of the division of labor.

Id.
20.

Cf id. at 128 (stating that managed care utilization control has been primarily focused
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the quality of care has become, in one sense, the last refuge of the independent
physician. Payors are eager to invade that refuge, and schemes that pay differentially
on the basis ofpayor-defined and measured quality performance would permit them to
do so.
IL.ConceptualProblemsin Payingfor Quality
Given the formidable array of actors who have lined up in support of financial
incentives for improved quality, one might reasonably expect that their arguments in
favor of such an approach would have a strong grounding in either experience or
theory. But arguments in support of financial incentives tend to rely on a number of
faulty, sometimes self-contradictory, presumptions, preconceptions, or folk beliefs.
A. The RelationshipBetween Quality and Cost
The first of these arguments involves some fundamental assumptions about the
relationship between cost and quality in the provision of health services. In a simpleminded economic model, the production function for "health care quality' would look
like the production function for most things--a simple linear relationship with perhaps
a start-up threshold at the left-hand end and a flattening on the right to reflect
diminishing marginal retums-as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1

Hypothetical Quality-Cost
Relationship
Cost
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0

2

4
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8
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on economic issues rather than quality of care issues).
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If this were an accurate depiction of the relationship between quality and
production cost, then paying more for higher quality would be a matter of
common sense. The empirical evidence we have, however, suggests that the
relationship conforms to this model only sometimes, if at all. For cardiac
catheterization and most forms of cardiac surgery, as the volume of procedures
at a particular hospital increases, the quality of service, as measured by such
outcomes as risk-adjusted morbidity and mortality, increases, while unit costs
decrease. 2' More generally, the quality of care seems to increase as hospitalspecific or physician-specific volume increases across a wide range of surgical
procedures and some kinds of medical cases; although the volume-cost
relationship is less well-studied, a fair assertion would be that unit costs may2
not always go down as volume increases, but they should rarely go up.
Similarly, in nursing home care and at least some acute hospital care, there
appears to be a threshold level of staffing for nurses, and perhaps other clinical
employees, below which it is impossible to attain even minimally satisfactory
quality of care. 23 Above that threshold, however, the correlation between
staffing levels and quality becomes considerably weaker, if not completely
random.24 And even the American Medical Association would be hard-pressed
to argue that the best physicians are those who charge the highest fees.
In its argument in support of testing financial incentives for improved
quality of care, the IOM committee argued that quality improvements often
require up-front investments by health care providers and, more generally, that
the incentives inherent in various payment schemes often fail to reward quality
improvements.25 Both of those assertions are sometimes true, although the
IOM report itself acknowledges that they are not always true.26 Other leaders in
21. For a good summary on this issue, see generally Edward L. Hannan, The Relation
Between Volume and Outcome in Health Care, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1677 (1999) (discussing
studies relating to the relationship of volume and outcome in hospitals).
22. For a full review of this literature, see generally Ethan A. Haim et al., Is Volume
Related to Outcome in Health Care? A Systematic Review and Methodologic Critique of the
Literature, 137 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 511 (2002).
23. See ABT Assoc., APPROPRIATENESS OF MINIMUM STAFFING RATIOS IN NURSING
HOMES, PHASE

I1FINAL

REPORT

3-2 (Winter 2001) (finding that 2.9 nurse aide hours per

resident per day are necessary to provide "good" care, and that less than 2.0 nurse aide hours per
resident per day is likely to result in "poor" care), available at http://www.cms.hms.gov/
medicaid/reports/RPl201home.ASP (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See id. at ES-I (finding that "no quality improvements are observed for staffing levels
above these thresholds").
25. See QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 191-95, 197-99 (finding that most common
payment methods have insufficient incentives to fix problems of overuse and present great
difficulty in fixing problems of misuse).
26. See id. at 193 (finding potential financial gain if under capitation or shared-risk
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the last generation's efforts to improve the quality of medical care (especially
those whom the experience in industrial process improvement influenced most)
more often argue that quality improvement reduces production costs because it
reduces the need for rework or starting over.2 7 In fact, both of these
propositions can be, and probably are, occasionally true. Sometimes higher
quality care is more expensive, and sometimes it is less expensive. But, if that
is the case, and higher payments are justified when higher quality is more
expensive, then should not payments be reduced when higher quality is less
expensive?
To complicate things further, quality is clearly multi-dimensional, but the
various dimensions of quality do not always vary uniformly with one another.
Moreover, the quality-cost relationship may not vary uniformly either, even in
the instance of a single patient being treated for a single condition. Thus, more
nursing care, especially in the intensive care unit, may improve the quality
while increasing the cost of a hospitalization for cancer surgery, but having the
operation performed by a more proficient, experienced surgeon may reduce the
cost while also increasing the quality. In this instance, the statistical truism
that, over time, things tend to even out probably provides a clue towards the
most rational course of action. That is to say, over time and a sufficiently large
number of cases, high quality and poor quality are probably about equally
expensive, or inexpensive. Therefore, attempting to tie the level ofpayment to
the level of quality cannot be justified in terms of relative costs.
B. Economic Incentives and ProviderBehavior
Just as the relationship between cost and quality is more complicated than
the notion of paying more for higher quality would seem to imply, so the actual
experience with provider responses to economic incentives is far more
complicated than simple-minded models of income-maximizing perfect firms
would suggest. When Medicare changed its method of payment for inpatient
hospital care from retrospective cost-based reimbursement to per-case payment
on the basis of DRGs, hospitals had a modest financial incentive to reduce
length of stay and a powerful financial incentive to increase Medicare
arrangement).
27.

For a recent example, see Henry B. Simmons, The Crisisin Health Care: The Time

forAction, Address at the Iowa Governor's Health Care Policy Forum 5 (Aug. 13, 2003) ("Any
good businessman knows that if you don't pay attention to quality, you will end up wasting
huge amounts of money."), available at http://www.nchc.org/materials/speeches/lowa%20
speech.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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admissions. Consequently, length of stay fell dramatically, but admissions
went down.28 New systems of prospective payment have led to shifts in
admissions patterns for nursing home patients (as they were designed to do),29
but dramatic changes in relative Medicare physicians' fees (designed to shift
utilization from "procedure-intensive" to "cognitive" services) do not appear to
have produced any such thing.30
Hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, and nurses make treatment choices
for many different, complicated, and interrelated reasons. Maximizing
economic returns is clearly one goal, but only one. Training, organizational
settings, the nature of relationships with patients, cultural and personal
prejudices, habit, and simple distraction or preoccupation are also important
influences. Mythology and simple misinformation may also contribute to an
alarming degree. Over time, different providers respond differently to both
different incentives and to the same incentives.
It is also important to remember how economic incentives actually work in
real situations, including those in health care, which is intrinsically, in some
ways, a profoundly uneconomic activity. In real economies, most of the action
takes place on the margins. To use my favorite example, if the price of pigs
goes up relative to the price of cattle, farmers will tend to raise more pigs and
fewer cows, but they will not seek to turn their cows into pigs. Likewise, if
reimbursements for endoscopies go up relative to payments for screening fecal
occult blood, gastroenterologists may be willing to work longer hours doing
procedures, but primary care physicians may be no more willing to try to
convince their patients to have those procedures done, nor willing to start doing
the procedures themselves. Over time, changes in those relative prices will
encourage a shift towards the higher-priced procedure; however, this result only
occurs if relative prices remain roughly the same and the technology remains
constant, a scenario which hardly ever arises.
Thus, although proponents of providing financial incentives for higher
quality may be advocating such an approach because of their frustration with
28.

See Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare'sProspectivePaymentSystem at Age Eight: Mature

Success or Midlife Crises?," 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 453, 458-60 (1991) (noting an
incentive in the Medicare payment program for hospitals to reduce length of stay and increase
admissions, but finding that although length of stay decreased as expected, admissions also

decreased).
29. See Nelda Mccall et al., Reforming Medicare Payment: Early Effects of the 1997
BalancedBudget Act on PostacuteCare, 81 MILBANK Q. 277,290 (2003) (finding a significant

decrease in home health care visits after implementation of the prospective payment systems).
30. See William B. Weeks & Amy E. Wallace, Medicare Payment Changes and
Physician'sIncomes, 29 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 18,18, 23 (2002) (discussing changes and noting

that the results did not accord with the anticipated effect).
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the apparent lack of efficacy of other measures, they may very well end up just
as frustrated with the effects of such incentives. Rather than seeking to more
fully understand why physicians or other providers may fail to provide care of
optimal quality, and then seeking to design interventions that address those
causes, advocates of economic incentives have focused, almost anecdotally, on
those instances in which payment methods may provide a disincentive for
higher quality. Proponents of economic incentives have then leaped from there
to a solution for what may be the wrong problem.
C. Economic Incentives in Real Payment Systems
The impact of financial incentives on the actual behavior of providers is
attenuated, if not entirely counteracted, not only by other influences on provider
behavior, but also by other characteristics of the payment systems themselves.
For example, Medicare determines the fee that it pays a particular physician for
a particular service primarily by the exact nature of that service, but it also
significantly adjusts to account for relative practice expenses in that physician's
specialty. Factors that figure into the payment determination include the costs
of rent, malpractice insurance, and labor in the metropolitan area in which the
physician practices, and the rate of growth in total Medicare physician
expenditures relative to some sort of exogenous budget target. 3' Medicare
adjusts payments to hospitals to account for such factors as relative wage levels
in the hospital's market, the number of interns and residents on the hospital's
payroll, the amount of care the hospital provides to low-income people, and the
size of the metropolitan area in which the hospital is located. 32 A complex
formula, which will become substantially more complex in the near future as
more sophisticated models of risk adjustment are applied to it, determines even
33
monthly capitated payments to HMOs participating in Medicare.
The complexities in the payment systems that public insurance programs
employ are perhaps an inevitable effect of the nature of the American
legislative process, 34 but the often-simpler process in which private payors
31. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 17-20 (2002) (defining how Medicaid determines physician payment rates).
32. See id. at 10-15 (discussing how Medicaid determines hospital payment rates).
33. See id. at 31-32 (explaining how Medicaid determines payment rates for
Medicaid+Choice plans).
34. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb.
1999, at 22, 30-31 (discussing politics of Medicare). Vladeck argues:
Medicare suppliers occupy a political territory of classic dimensions in American
political science: narrowly focused interest groups with an enormous specific stake
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negotiate fees with providers generally employs at least the relative prices in
Medicare payment systems as the starting point for price-setting. Thus, the
economic "signals" embodied in any particular pricing arrangement are
multiple, complicated, interacting, and confusing. Adding in an additional
signal relative to quality may or may not convey a message powerful enough to
get heard, let alone acted upon.
In my own experience, although analysts and policymakers love to devote
considerable attention to even the most minute details of payment formulae, the
characteristic of payment systems that has far and away the greatest effect on
providers is the absolute level of payments. If, on average, across all patients
that a particular payor covers, that payor's payments are relatively generous,
providers are happy and more willing to respond to other agendas that the payor
might have. To the extent that payments are, on average, thought to be too low,
providers will be unhappy and uncooperative no matter what else the payor
does. The clearest evidence of this phenomenon is provided by the experience
under Medicare+Choice since the implementation of the Balanced Budget Act
in 1998. For all the hundreds of hours of effort and disputation that went into
formulation of the exact details of the Medicare+Choice payment system, the
budget neutrality-imposed constraints on year-to-year growth in payments rates
have driven a large proportion of plans out of the system altogether-at which
point, they are, of course, impervious to even the most powerful marginal
incentives.
Further, money is fungible, so that revenue a provider receives in response
to finely-tuned policy incentive x can-and likely will-be spent on some other
component of the provider's expenses altogether; conversely, failure to meet an
incentive target that might increase overall revenue by one or two percent can
be overcome in any number of alternative ways, whether from other aspects of
performance for which the provider is overpaid, other sources of revenue, or
related or unrelated foregone expenses. CEOs and Boards of Trustees tend to
focus on the bottom line precisely because worrying about the relationship of
revenue to cost for every patient or every department is not only an impossible
task, but is ultimately foolish.

in issues about which the rest of the body politic could really care less, seeking
benefits of enormous importance to themselves, but almost invisible in the total
aggregate of the federal budget. They thus have succeeded in resisting almost every
effort to improve Medicare's purchasing by enlisting key members of Congress to
defend their constituents from the depredations of the "big bad federal
bureaucracy."
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One could posit a hypothetical world in which all providers were paid on
the basis of their actual costs or charges, and financial incentives for higher
quality were then made available as an explicit add-on. One would expect that,
in such a world, the impact of incentives would be greater than it is likely to be
under today's circumstances. In that hypothetical, providers would know that
they would break even if they performed at some average quality level but
could make a profit by improving quality (because the relationship between
production cost and quality is rarely linear). But, despite its obvious
advantages, the very notion of any form of cost-based reimbursement is
currently so antithetical to conventional wisdom in health policy that such a
discussion is almost certain to remain in the realm of the hypothetical for many
years to come. Therefore, adding quality incentives to existing payment
arrangements may be roughly as effective as adding a comedian's skit to a
burlesque review-some of the audience will pay attention, but others will
remain mentally focused on the more visually-compelling acts.
D. The Problem of Suboptimization
Although the initial notion of paying more for higher quality care seems
simple enough, actual efforts to do it are likely to encounter problems of
suboptimization in addition to those described above. These problems arise
because quality has many dimensions and many components, and both
measurement processes and financial incentives must generally rely on
,measures that are partial or intermediate at best. Thus, in its initial payment
demonstration for Medicare+Choice plans caring for patients with congestive
heart failure (CHF), CMS uses two process measures: the proportion of CHF
patients whose left ventricular function has been appropriately evaluated; and
the proportion for whom ACE inhibitors have been prescribed, or whose
records indicate the reasons for forgoing ACE inhibitors.3 5 These are both
perfectly valid indicators drawn from state-of-the art medical literature, but they
surely constitute only a fraction of all the things an optimally-performing health
system would do for CHF patients. Efforts to prevent the onset of CHF, for
example, although almost certainly not economically rational for most
Medicare+Choice plans-given the turnover among enrollees, the difficulties
of prevention, and the time lags involved-are not encouraged by these
incentives and, to the extent that providers "teach to the test," may even be
discouraged by default.

35.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 2, at 11.
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Conceptually, the only way to avoid suboptimization in providing
incentives (financial or otherwise) for quality improvement would be to base
rewards and sanctions on "ultimate" outcomes, such as morbidity and survival
rates in the relevant population. But, there are many good reasons for not doing
so. The most important are the inherent variability in human populations and
the partial, and at times tangential, nature of the causal relationship between
medical care, however comprehensive, and health outcomes. Providers should
only be held accountable for things that they can influence. On the other hand,
the more partial, narrow, and specific the measures on which any system of
rewards is based, the greater the danger of suboptimization will be, and the
logic of financial incentives suggests that such systems will be more prone to
that danger than other more subjective and multidimensional efforts to
characterize and promote high quality services.
IV Practicaland EthicalProblems in FinancialIncentives for Improved
Quality
A. Setting Thresholds
Even if all of the conceptual problems briefly described above could be
adequately addressed, at least five problems with the design and
implementation of financial incentives for improved quality of care have both
practical and ethical dimensions that may not be resolvable. The first of these
problems is the question of where one sets the threshold, or thresholds, above
which incentives will be paid.
Even though attention to the quality of health care in the United States has
increased dramatically in recent years, a general concern with the quality of
care is hardly a recent phenomenon, nor are efforts to insure that patients
receive care of at least minimally adequate quality. Historically, quality
assurance efforts focused on establishing a minimum, or floor, below which the
quality of care is presumed to be entirely unacceptable, and historically those
minima were defined in terms of provider qualifications and basic structure and
process measures.36 Thus, the primal quality assurance and quality
improvement measure in the United States, as in most other countries, was the
professional licensure of physicians and other health professionals, followed by
36.

See COMM. TO DESIGN A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY REVIEW & ASSURANCE IN MEDICARE,

NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 46-47 (Kathleen N.
Lohr ed., 1990) [hereinafter STRATEGY] (stating that quality assurance programs may have many

goals, including working with providers to bring care to an acceptable level).
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the development and implementation of licensure and accreditation standards
for hospitals and other health facilities. More recently, for most categories of
health facilities other than hospitals (where legally sanctioned private
accreditation still dominates), Medicare Conditions of Participation define the
de facto minima in facility characteristics and operations.37
Although some experts appropriately have criticized licensure and
accreditation for providing inadequate incentives for quality improvement, as
opposed to establishing minimum standards, at least some of the problem
clearly can be attributed to the ways in which these standards are enforced, or
not enforced. More to the point, to use what has become the dominant
metaphor in quality discourse, such efforts can remove the low-end tail of the
distribution of provider quality but conceptually cannot move the median of the
distribution to the right-towards higher quality. It is improvements in the
average level of quality-shifting the distribution to the right-that are the
focus of most discussions of financial incentives for quality.3"
But, to say that financial incentives should be designed to increase the
proportion of providers meeting upper-level standards for optimal care begs the
question of just where one should set the threshold for paying incentives, a
problem that is fundamentally insoluble. If only the rarest and most
accomplished providers are capable of meeting the targets, then even relatively
generous incentives are unlikely to have much effect on providers with a
realistic assessment of their chances. But, if the threshold is set too low, not
only is payment of incentives likely to be very expensive, but it risks rewarding
mediocrity.
More importantly, reasonably-qualified providers must be able to
reasonably attain targets describing optimal quality; otherwise, the targets are
inadequately-defined or overly particularistic. Assuming that one can define
such targets, and a significant fraction of providers are already meeting them,
then Medicare or any other payor will increase its costs with no incremental
benefit to its beneficiaries until those providers who have historically not
performed as well improve. But, assume that relatively few providers now
meet the targets, and that in the real world, the rate at which they improve will
vary considerably from one provider to another, even when all are operating
under the same financial incentives. At some point in time, under this
hypothetical, roughly half of the providers will be receiving extra payments.
But, there will then be a serious question as to whether those who still have not
37. See id. at 119-24 (discussing the adequacy of the Conditions of Participation as they
relate to quality assurance).
38. Cf Berenson, supra note 4, at 1319-22 (discussing why Medicare needs to pay for
improved quality).
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met the targets should be paid at all. If half the providers can meet some
standard of optimal care, why should not that standard be a floor below which
patients should not drop, a floor that can now be empirically defined as
substandard care?
That the quality of care is not randomly distributed among providers at any
particular point in time, but that there are in fact both significant geographic
variation and some correlation between the quality of care that physicians and
facilities in certain communities provide and the relative affluence of those
communities, substantially exacerbates the threshold-setting problem. 39 A
relatively standardized incentive for achievement of a standard score on quality
measures will, in the short run, send extra Medicare dollars to Vermont and
Minnesota but not Louisiana or Texas, even if the overall level of quality does
not change at all. The rich would literally get richer.
Alternatively, one could define financial incentives not in terms of
meeting some absolute threshold but in terms of an individual provider's
improvement from some baseline: doing x%/o better in year t than year t-1 might
produce an additional payment of m; doing 20% better would produce an
additional payment of 2m. But then, providers who were giving the best care
before the incentives were put into place would get nothing, while those
providing the worst care would have the greatest-and perhaps easiestopportunity to cash in. Again, this problem-and ineffectual potential
solution-applies not just within a given community, where its insolubility is
obvious, but across communities, where the political (and perhaps intellectual)
problems are much greater.
These are not just technical problems of policy design. For the
administrator of a public program, such as Medicare, if a substantial proportion
of providers can reach quality thresholds that make them eligible for incentive
payments, the moral defensibility of permitting those who cannot to continue
serving program beneficiaries at all is a serious problem, particularly when the
correlation between quality and input costs is as tenuous as it is. It is also not
clear a priori whether the substandard providers should be punished or
"rehabilitated," that is, whether they should be paid less (or nothing at all, if
they are excluded from the program), or paid more in the form of supportive
services to help them meet the thresholds in the future.
The problem of how to design fair payment systems in a world in which,
at any given time, providers differ from one another in all sorts of ways-both

39. Steven F. Jencks et al., Change in the Quality of Care Delivered to Medicare
Beneficiaries, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001, 289 JAMA 305, 307-08 (2003) (summarizing, by
chart, quality indicator averages by state).
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economic and non-economic-is not confined to the issue of incentives for
quality; it is a generic problem. But, I would argue that it is particularly
problematic, ethically if not conceptually, when applied to quality. If one is
concerned only about financial incentives for cost-effectiveness and efficiency
in the provision of care, then one accepts the best compromise one can fashion
between horizontal equity, vertical equity, economic efficiency, and political
constraints. But, when the quality of medical care is at stake, then so are issues
of life and death. All other things being equal, patients with certain conditions
treated by low-quality providers are less likely to survive than those treated by
high-quality providers (although mortality is only one very crude measure of
quality). Especially when a public agency is doing the purchasing, equitable
treatment of providers must take a back seat to the payor's responsibility to help
assure the health and safety of beneficiaries. If, in that enterprise, one can
identify an adequate supply of providers who exceed any given qualitative
standard, then no other providers should be permitted to participate in the
program at all until they too can meet those standards. "Adequate supply" is a
significant constraint, but the general principle still holds. If some relatively
representative group of providers consistently provides care of a higher quality,
then those operating at a lower level of quality should be expected to improve
within some reasonable period of time or find another line of work.
B. The Idea of Quality Improvement
The principle that the floor is, at least for operational purposes in public
programs, on par in importance with the ceiling actually dovetails in interesting
ways with the second practical-ethical problem with quality incentives. The
inconsistency of such incentives with the logic of Continuous Quality
Improvement (CQI), the philosophy derived from the manufacturing sector
(and especially the Japanese manufacturing sector) that now supposedly
underlies both public and private quality strategies. 40 As applied to medical
care, the idea of CQI is that one attains optimal quality not by standardizing
practices and procedures to hit a set of fixed targets, but by a process of
continual self-examination and self-monitoring to detect problems, analyze and
understand their sources and components, take remedial action, and maintain
feedback loops to evaluate the effectiveness of those remedies-all in a series
of continual loops in which providers are always in the process of identifying
new problems while turning attention away from prior problems that appear to
40. See Chassin, supra note 9, at 585-86 (suggesting that hospitals with high-volume for
procedures produce better quality results).
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have been at least partially remedied. As the basis for a quality improvement
strategy, CQI is especially applicable to health care, an industry in which many
different individuals and organizations are generally involved in the
"production process," the level of technical complexity is especially high, and
the rate of change in technology and scientific knowledge is also especially
high. For hospitals, JCAHO Accreditation Standards and Medicare Conditions
of Participation already require hospitals to maintain CQI processes, although at
most institutions such processes are in relatively primitive stages of
development.41
In organizations with effective CQI processes, the issues on which the
organization focuses at any given time are-and should be-constantly
changing. Meeting performance targets relative to one measure only suggests
that that measure is already passd. Rewarding HMOs--or physicians or
hospitals-in 2005 for improvements in performance in 2003 and 2004 on
measures promulgated in 2002 would seem to operate in exactly the opposite
direction. More to the point, a commitment to CQI would seem to suggest that
organizations that were doing particularly well in managing, for example,
congestive heart failure in 2002 should be focusing their attention on something
entirely different-perhaps diabetes, depression, or colon cancer screening
rates-in 2003 and 2004 (while doing whatever necessary to prevent
backsliding in the congestive heart failure performance levels).
C. Zero Defects
In principle, the process of reducing medical errors should be an intrinsic
part of any quality improvement process, something the IOM reports clearly
envision. 42 But, as attention has focused specifically on reduction of medical
errors, as opposed to other forms of quality improvement, conceptual
developments have also moved away from notions consistent with financial
incentives for increased quality. The appropriately prevailing notion in the
medical error reduction process, one again borrowed from successful industrial
models, is that of "zero defects." As Professor Mark Chassin articulated in an
especially influential article, that approach, as exemplified in the quality
improvement practices of General Electric, for example, establishes a target
error range of six standard deviations from the mean of our familiar normal
41. See STRATEGY, supra note 36, at 125-28 (laying out the development of the Quality
Assurance Condition of Participation).
42. See QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 122-23 (discussing the three-part strategy the
1OM

report outlined for creating health care process for safety).
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distribution-the goal should be to avoid preventable, harmful errors in the
production process 99.99% of the time.43 In many instances, it should be
noted, doing so will reduce production costs as well."
In this "six sigma" process, accepting a level of performance that is only
three or four standard deviations better than the mean-for example, by paying
some financial bonus for its attainment-would be to settle for a level of
performance far below what should be attainable, and therefore to undermine
the very error reduction process itself. More importantly, in every organization,
the norm should not be the median, but continuing efforts to eliminate all
defects. To establish anything less than ideal performance as the basis for
incentive payments would be self-contradictory; yet once the "ideal" is reached,
the goal should become exceeding that ideal.
In reducing medical errors, in other words, it is important to establish as
lofty a goal as possible; to complacently accept, let alone reward, anything short
of that goal should be unacceptable. Commitment to such goals should be
expected of all participants in the health care system. To the extent that
payment is, or should be, a consideration at all, it should be conditioned on
efforts to achieve the normative level of performance-which is to say, a level
which no existing organization ought to be able to achieve. Such efforts, if not
such achievements, should be a minimal expectation for being paid at all, not
the basis for supplementary rewards.
D. The Reality of Quality Improvement
Given the problems with constructing defensible, workable systems to
reward quality improvements with financial benefits, those concerned about the
quality of health care provided to Medicare beneficiaries or other Americans
would seem to really be in the soup were it not that quality, at least in the
Medicare program, appears to be improving quite rapidly in the absence of
financial incentives. As Steven Jencks and others recently reported, quality of
care for fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, as measured by twenty-two
agreed-upon indicators, improved on twenty of those measures (by an average
of 12.8%) in the relatively short period of two years ending in 2000-2001 .45
43. See Chassin, supra note 9, at 567 ("Six sigma quality means setting tolerance limits
for defective products at such high levels that fewer than 3.4 defects occur per million units (or
opportunities).").
44. See Chassin et al., supra note 14, at 1002-03 (concluding that "substantial
opportunities exist to increase quality and decrease cost simultaneously by ameliorating
problems of overuse and misuse").
45. Jencks et al., supra note 39, at 309.
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Using measures over a longer period-seven years-Sehgal reported that the
proportion of Medicare dialysis treatments that met four basic quality criteria
doubled-from 43% to 860/--between 1993 and 2000.46 Others had reported
similar results earlier for inpatient hospital care of Medicare patients who had
experienced uncomplicated, acute myocardial infarctions (AMI).47 All of these
results were associated with programs in which a set of indicators was
developed through professional consensus and a process of systematic periodic
measurement of those indicators was implemented in conjunction with
mechanisms to feed back to individual providers data on their performance, and
that of their peers, over time.48 In conjunction with a variety of educational and
informational activities, continuing progress reports were routinely provided.49
No program ever offered explicit financial incentives.50
Although in all of these areas, even after dramatic improvement, the
quality of care remains far below the optimum, and although it is unlikely that
the pace of change reported in these articles can be sustained over time, as
additional increments in quality become more difficult to achieve, these are
nonetheless dramatic results achieved in a relatively short time. It is difficult to
see how the introduction of financial incentives could have produced any better
results, and given physicians' mistrust of payors and the complexity of payment
systems, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which efforts focused primarily
around financial incentives would have produced worse results. At least in
these instances, appealing to the professionalism and pride-and professional
competitiveness---of practicing physicians appears to have worked as a
motivation for quality improvement. These results would certainly seem, at a
minimum, to call into question the necessity of financial incentives and also to
suggest that the case for quality improvement through educational methods may

46. Ashwini H. Sehgal, Impact of Quality Improvement Efforts on Race and Sex
Disparitiesin Hemodialysis, 289 JAMA 996, 998 (2003).
47. See Thomas Marciniak et al., Improving the Quality of Carefor Medicare Patients
with Acute MyocardialInfarction: Resultsfrom the CooperativeCardiovascularProject,279

JAMA 1351, 1356 (1998) (stating that quality of care for AMI improved in program states
between baseline and follow-up periods of the study).
48. See Jencks et al., supra note 39, at 306-09 (discussing methods used in gathering
data); Marciniak et al., supra note 47, at 1352-53 (same); Sehgal, supra note 46, at 996 (same).
49. See Marciniak et al., supra note 47, at 1352-53 (discussing the feedback and
educational opportunities provided to practitioners); Sehgal, supranote 46, at 997 (stating that
performance data, educational materials, and workshops were provide to clinicians).
50. See Jencks et al., supra note 39, at 306-09 (discussing the methodology of the study
which lacked any mention of financial incentives); Marciniak et al., supra note 47, at 1351-54
(discussing the design and feedback features of the study); Sehgal, supra note 46, at 996-97
(discussing the design and intervention features of the study).
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be much stronger than is generally acknowledged in the literature advocating
financial incentives.
The ethical implications of these findings, and others like them, are
immediately apparent. If improving the quality of care is a shared goal among
providers and payors, then opportunities exist for truly collaborative efforts in
pursuit of a common goal, with no intrinsic ceiling on attainment of that goal.
Embodying quality goals in an economic transaction, on the other hand,
attaches an arbitrary (and potentially incomprehensible) value to an exchange.
The implication of the economic transaction is that quality is something the
provider would withhold in the absence of payment, and that there is some
level of quality less than perfect that the payor deems not only satisfactory but
is the most for which he is willing to pay. In the context of the preceding
discussion, it is difficult to imagine that this is the message we really want those
public agencies that are, among other things, payors to convey.
E. Incentivesfor Quality and the Tiering ofInsurance Benefits
Perhaps the most frightening contemporary manifestation of the movement
towards incorporating incentives for higher-quality care into provider payments
is embodied in some health plans' recent efforts to establish "multi-tiered"
systems of insurance.5 Under such arrangements, insurance plan beneficiaries
would pay differential coinsurance for hospital care (and, eventually,
presumably for other types of services as well) depending on the "tier" to which
the insurer assigned the hospital or physician group.52 Use of hospitals or
physicians in more expensive tiers would require higher out-of-pocket
payments from patients. Significantly, even though the insurance plans that
have already implemented such systems claim that they will incorporate quality
3
measurements into their tiering process, none have yet done so.1
The development of multi-tiered hospital networks is perhaps an inevitable
outgrowth of contemporary trends in which employers and insurers, faced with
rapidly-increasing premium costs, are seeking to shift as much of the cost of
health insurance to employees as they can, sugarcoated (or disguised) with
rhetoric about "consumer choice" and "greater consumer involvement" in their
51. See James C. Robinson, HospitalTiers in Health Insurance: Balancing Consumer
Choice with Financial Motives, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE (last visited on Jan. 14, 2004)
(noting the emergence of tiered hospital networks), at http://content.healthaffairs.org
/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.135vl/DCI (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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own health care.14 It is also a response, of course, to the continuing frustration
on the part of payors over the extent to which the costs and prices of inpatient
hospital services continue to vary so much, even within specific communities,
and often for reasons that are hard to identify or explain. In part, tiering
strategies are the insurers' response to hospital administrators' assertions that
costs and quality are more highly correlated than they are.
But if insurers do, in fact, incorporate quality information into their tiering
process, it would presumably be done so that patients would not have to pay
more money out-of-pocket to receive care at a hospital that had higher costs but
also higher quality. The insurer would then be in the position of telling its
beneficiaries that they would face the same out-of-pocket cost at a high-cost,
high-quality institution as they would at a low-cost, low-quality one. That is
hardly an incentive for quality, or a signal that insurers would seem to want to
send.
More likely, insurers will seek to mollify high-quality, high-cost providers
by charging consumers more to use them, but also making comparative quality
information available so that consumers will themselves have the "choice" of
how much more they are prepared to pay to reduce the likelihood that they will
be maimed or killed during the course of their hospitalization. At this point, the
tiering of hospitals becomes both morally and practically indefensible because
the marginal utility of a consumer's discretionary dollar is directly
proportionate to the amount of disposable income that the consumer has.
Wealthy people will then be able to buy all the quality that the market is
capable of providing, while lower-income people will have to make practical
tradeoffs between the quality of their medical care, rent, and utilities.
Of course, Americans have long accepted a health care marketplace that
distributes access to health care at least partially on the basis of socioeconomic
and ethnic status. 55 But, no matter how reprehensible that practice may be,
accepting, or even encouraging, differentials in the quality of care available to
individuals on the basis of their purchasing power crosses another moral divide
altogether. To the extent they are minimally safe and functional, we
countenance enormous disparities in this society on the basis of income or
wealth in the quality of housing or transportation or clothing people are able to
54. See Humphrey Taylor, From the Field: How and Why the Health Insurance System
Will Collapse, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 195, 195 (noting a trend in the health care

industry to offer more "consumer directed" health plans).
55.

Cf INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 59-

100 (2001) (discussing the socioeconomic and ethnic factors that make a person more or less
likely to be insured), availableat http://books.nap.edu/html/coverage matters (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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obtain, but the underlying premise of the movement to improve health care
quality is that quality effects outcomes-that is, health and illness and life and
death. Although the correlation between income, health status, and life
expectancy is already very powerful, advocating policies that would have the
effect of making that relationship stronger runs directly counter to all the moral
and religious principles that supposedly underlie American society.
V. The Root Problem: Payingfor ProfessionalServices
Health care is different. Even in a society as thoroughly market-oriented
as modem America-with an intelligentsia totally besotted with a potent mix of
market ideology and market mythology-we subsidize, regulate, and finance
health care services in ways that reflect the profound differences between how
we view health care and other services and goods in the economy. Health care
is different because it involves matters of life and death, pain and suffering, and
the relief of pain and suffering. But, it is also different from most, but not all,
sectors of the economy and society because it is provided largely through the
activities of highly-trained professionals.
In his most recent book on professionalism, the sociologist Eliot Freidson
writes: "The two most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief
that certain work is so specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the
required training and experience, and the belief that it cannot be standardized,
rationalized, or... 'commodified."' 56
The first aspect of medical
professionalism is precisely what the payors, health services researchers, and
government officials are, of course, trying to invade, or at least circumscribe,
under the rubric of improving quality in the health system. It is what Freidson
identifies as the second idea, however, that poses the greatest challenges in the
relationship between the health professions and the rest of society, and the
greatest obstacle to schemes to affect the quality of health services through
payment incentives.
For the practice of medicine---or nursing, physical therapy, clinical
psychology, or any of the other health professions-is not solely a matter of the
rational application of scientific knowledge and data from the latest literature.
There is an important subjective component to human health and illness, and
important intersubjective interaction exists in the patient-health professional
encounter. Moreover, not all of medical knowledge can currently--or, I would
argue, ever-be expressed in objectively reproducible scientific information. A

56.

ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 17(2001).
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good physician can, and must, rely on subjective observation, experience, and
practiced intuitive judgment. The combination of scientific knowledge with
training and experience in the experiential and subjective aspects of the client's
situation is precisely what we mean in defining professional roles in our current
society.
In general, acquiring the non-objectified skills and experience necessary
for effective professional practice is a primary focus of professional training,
which is customarily a demanding and prolonged experience that is expected to
inculcate a set of values and behaviors in the future professional as well. This
indoctrination is as true for lawyers-to-be, architects-to-be, and teachers-to-be
as it is for aspiring medical students, interns, and residents. And this
inculcation of values and beliefs is especially important, not because it
reinforces a sense of professional identity and "us versus them" in aspiring
professionals, but because it is essential for the protection of the clients whom
the professional will ultimately serve and for the benefit of the broader
society.57 By definition, lay people cannot adequately judge or evaluate all
aspects of professional performance; the rule of caveat emptor, which is
sovereign in an American-style market, cannot apply. No matter how much we
try to describe or measure or circumscribe the domain of professional
experience and professional judgment, at the end of the day we have to trust the
professionals. There really is no other choice.
Of course, not all professionals behave professionally all of the time, and
the failure of the professions to adequately police themselves has led,
unavoidably, to all sorts of mechanisms to regulate the boundary between
professional sovereignty and broader social control. In general, modest
financial incentives are not among the most effective of such mechanisms, but
for the purposes immediately at hand, that is somewhat beside the point. What
is critically important is the fact that the protection of patients' interests and the
provision of the highest possible quality care are among the central values-if
not the central values-of medical professionalism. No matter how much
individual professionals, or the health professions as a whole, may fail to
uphold those values in individual instances or in general, promoting and
reinforcing those values must be the heart of any strategy to improve the quality
of medical care.
On several occasions, I have heard Dr. Uwe Rinehardt of Princeton
University, the distinguished health economist, pose the following question to
groups of physicians: Imagine you have agreed to perform a certain operation
57. See id. at 18 (discussing how specialization is needed for survival because few can do
all they need to be self-sufficient).
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and to accept a fee of $5000 from the patient's insurer. On the day of surgery,
you are in the operating room, the patient is fully anesthetized, and you have
begun the procedure when you receive a telephone call informing you that you
will be paid only $3000 for the operation. Will you do it any less well? 58
Regardless of how physicians might envision themselves actually behaving,
most will appropriately take umbrage at the very question Reinhardt poses and
insist that their actual performance in surgery would be no different at the lower
fee than the higher. They might pursue a variety of forms of redress from the
insurance company or the patient after the operation was successfully
concluded, and they would certainly be well within their rights to refuse to
operate ever again on that insurer's patients. But, under the circumstances
immediately at hand, most physicians would argue-sincerely-that their
obligations to their patient and to their profession itself would require the best
professional performance that they could possibly provide. Similarly, it is hard
to imagine that a thoughtful physician would argue that his colleague who
volunteers to provide free services at a local clinic or in a third world refugee
camp is performing at a lower professional level, or providing a lower quality
service-although the practice environment may be of lower, or at least
different, quality.
Professionals, in other words, are paid (or not paid) to do what they do,
and what they do should entail, at all times, their best efforts. This idea is not
just a matter of exhortation; it is instead a principle integral to the ethics of any
profession. To assume, or imply, that a professional paid 2x will perform
significantly better than if he is paid x is to describe behavior that is inherently
unprofessional. In order to systematically and significantly improve the quality
of care in the United States, we are going to have to increase the
professionalism of those who work in the health care system, not ignore or
destroy it.
Paying appropriately for the services of professionals is an intrinsically
difficult task. In the American context, it is certainly not clear that we have
done substantially better in figuring out payment systems for lawyers, research
scientists, or teachers than we have for physicians or nurses. For a variety of
historical reasons, American physicians-and perhaps to an even greater
degree, other American health professionals-are extremely well compensated
in comparison to other professionals, non-professional workers, and their
counterparts in other countries. For that reason alone, it might be reasonable
for the rest of us to expect higher-quality performance than we frequently getalthough, again, there is a growing body of evidence that shows that appeals to
58.
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professional motivation, when combined with appropriate data systems,
feedback mechanisms, and educational efforts, can indeed appropriately
mobilize professional aspirations.59 But, getting professional compensation
right is hard enough without at the same time overlaying a potentially distorting
quality agenda.
VI. Conclusion
At the outset of this Article, I suggested that the conceptual issues
involved in providing financial incentives for higher-quality health care were so
important that they should be considered on their own merits, apart from the
very real issues of whether developing appropriate measurement devices, data
systems, and incentive structures would prove feasible in the first place. There
has been so much progress over the last twenty years in defining and measuring
the quality of care that it would be a mistake to be too pessimistic about the
technical problems in quality measurement or reporting, although some of those
problems may indeed be insoluble as a result of the remaining uncertainty
intrinsic to much of medical practice. But, the avidity with which payors and
policymakers are rushing to adopt financial incentives for quality before the
technical issues can truly be said to have been satisfactorily solved suggests that
this may indeed be more a matter of ideology and public relations than part of a
thoughtful, long-term strategy to improve quality.
Whatever the technical issues, though, two things should be clear by this
point. First, there are numerous conceptual, practical, and even ethical
problems in establishing systems to pay health care providers differentially on
the basis of variances in the quality of care they provide-whether those
differences are "real" or the artifact of some inadequate measurement system.
Second, the quality of care can be improved without financial incentives. One
would think that at a minimum the burden of proof would lie with advocates for
financial incentives and that it is fair to say that, to this point, they have not
adequately shouldered that burden.
In specific reference to Medicare, Berenson argues that the program would
better serve beneficiaries and taxpayers alike if it operated more like an
aggressive "purchaser" and less like a passive payor of bills. 60 As one who
59. See Jencks, supra note 39, at 305 (citing the progess that has been made with respect
to improving the quality of care); Sehgal, supra note 46, at 996 (finding that the improvement
seen in this study was due to the Medicare quality improvement project that provided feedback
and education opportunities for physicians).
60. See Berenson, supra note 4, at 1322-28 (discussing why Medicare should be active
and not passive).
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personally helped formulate and advocate for some of the earliest efforts to
implement a "purchasing" strategy for Medicare, I can hardly disagree,
especially with such proposals as establishing prices through competitive
bidding, recognizing and rewarding (through patient volume, not financial
incentives) centers of excellence, and excluding low-quality providers from
participation in the program to the extent that access considerations permit.
But, acting as an aggressive and prudent purchaser does not require paying
differentially for quality. Indeed, most of this Article has been devoted to
arguing that such incentives are about the last thing that a prudent purchaser
would want to adopt.
Medicare can maintain its position of leadership in promoting higher
quality care without distorting its payment systems by implementing the
addition of extra payments for providers exceeding some quality threshold. It
can act as a more effective purchaser by adopting any of a number of strategies.
These two approaches are not incompatible. Public programs and public
agencies can do more than one thing at once; they do multiple things, many of
them successfully, all the time. But financial incentives for quality are one
bandwagon on which Medicare should not jump. Sometimes asserting
leadership and being progressive means resisting the temptation of the latest
fads. After all, the first principle of medical professionalism is: Do no harm.

